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Shifting Gravity Eastward

Between American Power Projection and the Geopolitical Awakening of the Umma

  • Interest
  • Identity
  • Power
Portrait of Aleksandar Ivanov

By Aleksandar Ivanov
November 2026 · 19 min read

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Originally published in Macedonian as: “The Incirlik Paradox, Asia’s Line of Conflict, and Europe’s Awakening from Geopolitical Coma” on MKD.mk: read the original

We live in an age of instant information in which media noise has become a new terrain of conflict, while day-to-day politics in Macedonia and the wider region remains stubbornly consumed by provincial banalities and short-term calculations.

Map titled “Shifting the gravity to the East: American ‘clamps’ and the Ummah triangle”. It marks the Eurasian wedge, the invisible wall of alliances around the Gulf, the triangle of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan at the core of the Ummah, an arrow to Indonesia, and the Malacca Strait and island clamp, under the banner “Power follows the economy”.
Figure 1. Shifting the gravity to the East: American “clamps” and the Ummah triangle. Image supplied by the author.

Yet beneath that din of daily statements, the tectonic plates of the international order are shifting according to an inexorable historical law: as the global economy inevitably moves East, Power (and its infrastructure) inevitably follows.

To understand this great migration of gravity and the way it is redefining alliances from the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific, we must first leave behind the comfortable analytical cage of the previous century.

For decades, traditional textbooks on international relations have begun the story with Thucydides, leapt to Machiavelli, and then focused almost exclusively on the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which consolidated the norm of territorial sovereignty and the practical secularization of the European order. As Barry Buzan and Richard Little argue with precision in their seminal study International Systems in World History, this approach suffers from a profound “temporal and spatial provincialism” because it entirely neglects the non-Western international systems that existed for millennia before Europe’s rise. (Buzan & Little, 2000).

The world is no longer binary. It is a realm of fluid “chromatic geopolitics” in which swing states adjust the tone and intensity of their alliances solely according to their own interests (see: “The Geopolitical Reflex of the Bosporus Throne”). As I warned in earlier analyses, the international system is rapidly moving from regulated deterrence toward deregulated strategic anarchy and entering what I have called the “Age of Thanatos”, a period in which primal instincts for domination and survival overpower the mechanisms of idealistic cooperation (see: “20 Days to the New Geopolitical Anarchy? From Eros to Thanatos”). This conceptual vocabulary also extends the author’s earlier analysis of Europe’s strategic decline and the rise of swing-state diplomacy (Ivanov, 2025a, 2025c).

In such a constellation, interests are always amoral, identity is energy, and power is the only currency that never depreciates.

Part IAmerican power projection

The American Strategic Design: Long-Term Vision and the “Invisible Wall” of Alliances

When analysing the shift of economic volume toward Asia, superficial commentators often rush to proclaim an alleged American decline. Such a reading misses the essence of American statecraft and its capacity for long-term strategic planning. The American political project may represent the most successful modern synthesis of institutional power and strategic vision in history (see: “The Geopolitics of Empty Space: The Lesson Europe Refuses to Learn”). The argument developed here continues the author’s broader thesis that the redistribution of economic weight does not automatically amount to the disappearance of American structural power (Ivanov, 2026a).

The United States did not become a global superpower solely because of its vast continent, natural resources, and economic expansion, but because from the outset it was shaped by statesmen with an exceptionally developed sense of history, law, and organization. America’s founders did not improvise. They translated European Enlightenment thought, itself deeply reconnected with the original Greco-Roman knowledge of philosophy, statecraft, and law, and carefully designed it into a functional political and constitutional model. This is clearly visible from the Declaration of Independence and Virginia’s first written constitution (1776) to the Constitution of the United States (1787).

Just as Rome, in its “unipolar moment” under Octavian Augustus and the Five Good Emperors, ruled not only through legions but also through roads, law, administration, and an ability to integrate the peripheries, Washington after 1945 built not only the West’s security architecture but also its intellectual, cultural, and developmental infrastructure. Through scholarships, academic exchanges, foundations, and technological standards, the United States created a global matrix in which soft power is not decoration but the most sophisticated instrument for shaping elites and order (Nye, 2004).

Today, as the economy gravitates Eastward, Washington is not reacting in panic. It is projecting power coolly and over the long term, on the basis of Hans Morgenthau’s classical triad: Geography, Economy, and Threat (see: “Venezuela: Morgenthau and Monroe in the New Multipolar Design”). America’s grand strategy for retaining primacy in the twenty-first century is unfolding simultaneously across several geographical theatres: (Morgenthau, 1948; Ivanov, 2026b).

  1. Dominance of its own hemisphere (the Monroe Doctrine in the twenty-first century): Washington has understood that, amid systemic competition across Eurasia, the Caribbean “backyard” must be fully secured against Chinese capital and Russian steel. The case of Venezuela, a country with 303 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, more even than Saudi Arabia, located only five days’ sailing from American refineries, showed how the United States secures its own energy logistics so as to remain immune to possible shocks additionally generated in the Strait of Hormuz.
  2. The three strategic “pincers” in Eurasia and the Pacific: To control and constrain China’s rise, the United States is methodically closing the space through three geopolitical pincers:
    1. The island pincer, control of the first island chain: Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines, which serves to prevent Chinese power projection into the Pacific;
    2. The Eurasian wedge: through the conflict in Ukraine, the energy and industrial cohesion between Russia and Europe has been durably severed, cementing American influence in Eurasia for the twenty-first century; and
    3. The Strait of Malacca, where the United States, together with allies such as Australia and India, retains the ability to cut off China’s maritime energy supplies at any moment.
  3. Capitalizing on the “invisible wall” of alliances: As the war in Iran demonstrated, America’s greatest asset is the network of alliances built over decades (see: “The Invisible Wall: How Decades-Old Alliances Encircled Iran and Redefined the Balance of Threat”). (Walt, 1987; Ivanov, 2026c).

Drawing on Stephen M. Walt’s theory of the “balance of threat”, according to which states balance not merely against raw power but against perceived threat, composed of aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions, the United States has masterfully exploited Middle Eastern states’ fear of Iran’s missile and proxy capabilities. Over the years, Washington did not need to coerce anyone. Geographic compression in the Gulf itself pushed states beneath the American radar, naval, and air umbrella, producing even tacit coordination between historical rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, and a complete bypassing of Iranian influence through the changes in Syria. (Walt, 1987).

Great powers are inertial and do not change course easily, “great powers don’t pivot!” Yet when Washington restructures its resources, even when it cuts portions of its soft-power budget to focus on hard geoeconomics and military deterrence, it does so from the position of the only actor that still possesses the “heavy artillery” of global deterrence.

Part IThe awakening of the Umma

The Transnational Umma: When the “Abode of Islam” Speaks the Language of Security

Across the space stretching from the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, through the Persian Gulf, to the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, however, a different geopolitical energy is awakening, one that cannot be explained solely through classical Westphalian arrangements.

Whereas the European model rests on strict territorial demarcation and secular national sovereignty, Islamic political thought has historically offered a radically different concept: the Umma, the global community of believers. (Mandaville, 2001).

To understand the weight of this concept in contemporary international relations, we must examine Peter Mandaville’s argument, which defines the Umma as a form of “transnational political imagination” that directly challenges modern state borders. In this worldview, belonging and loyalty to the wider religious and civilizational community are often elevated above narrow loyalty to the nation-state (watan). In the classical Islamic order, borders were fluid and law, Sharia, was personal rather than territorial. This meant that every Muslim enjoyed the same rights, status, and protection wherever they travelled within Dar al-Islam, the “Abode of Islam”. Unlike modern nation-states, Dar al-Islam is not defined by fixed lines drawn with a ruler on a map, but as a secure space in which Islamic order, solidarity, and law prevail. (Hurd, 2008).

Elizabeth Shakman Hurd rightly notes that Western international-relations theory remained captive for too long to the Westphalian paradigm, which assumes that religion is an exclusively private matter confined within the borders of the sovereign state. The Umma breaks down that artificial barrier between the “sacred” and the “political”. It is not merely a theological category but a powerful transnational political subject that makes national borders porous and enables the effective mobilization of financial resources, military technology, political support, and legitimacy across state boundaries.

It is precisely through this theoretical prism that the contemporary strategic and defence alignment among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan acquires its full meaning. Viewed only through a bureaucratic lens, this triangle appears to be an ordinary pragmatic agreement for military-technical and financial cooperation.

Yet in the deep geopolitics of identity, this alliance represents an attempt to create a gravitational core of the Sunni Umma, bringing together three complementary components of power:

  • Saudi Arabia’s financial sovereignty and symbolic legitimacy: As custodian of the holy places and an energy giant, Riyadh has the liquidity and spiritual authority required to finance major defence and infrastructure projects.
  • Pakistan’s nuclear shield and demographic-military mass: As the only nuclear power in the Islamic world, with a vast conventional army and extensive combat experience, Islamabad gives this triangle the strategic depth and deterrent capacity that the Arabian Peninsula lacks.
  • Türkiye’s industrial, technological, and operational engine: Ankara enters this architecture with its expanding defence industry, ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles and smart munitions to shipbuilding, air-defence systems, and electronic warfare.

Moreover, the prospects for networking the Islamic world through the concept of the Umma do not end in Islamabad. At the eastern edge of this civilizational arc rises Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country and the largest Muslim nation on the planet.

Situated at the geostrategic gateway to the Strait of Malacca, which connects trade between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Indonesia, with its demographic vitality and economic growth, is becoming a key pillar in this transnational equation. Ankara and Riyadh’s intensive military-technological, educational, and economic cooperation with Jakarta demonstrates that the concept of the Umma in the twenty-first century is being transformed from historical nostalgia into a functional network of middle and great powers seeking a place at the world’s “high table”, in a world whose economic weight has already shifted Eastward.

This reading develops the analytical line first advanced in “The Geopolitical Reflex of the Bosporus Throne,” where Türkiye was interpreted not as a passive bridge but as an actor seeking the status of an autonomous centre (Ivanov, 2025b).

Part II

The Incirlik Paradox, Asia’s Line of Conflict, and Europe’s Awakening from Geopolitical Coma

In the first part of this analysis, we defined the contours of the new geopolitical gravity: the inexorable movement of the economy and Power toward the East; America’s long-term projection of power through the three strategic “pincers” and the “invisible wall” of alliances; and the awakening of the transnational Umma through the strategic triangle linking Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, complemented by the demographic and economic giant of Indonesia. Yet, to avoid the romantic delusion that the Islamic world or the Asian space is turning into harmonious, monolithic blocs, we must examine, with surgical precision, the internal paradoxes of these alliances and the sharp lines of active conflict cutting across Eurasia.

Part IIThe Incirlik paradox

The Bosporus Reflex and the Technological Truth: Why Ankara’s Road to the Umma Runs through Incirlik

At the centre of every discussion about the political and military articulation of the contemporary Umma stands Türkiye. As I elaborated in detail in the column devoted to Turkish foreign policy, Ankara is the most vital example of a state simultaneously playing on three chessboards: Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of modern borders through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), followed by the revision of the Straits regime under the Montreux Convention (1936), Kemal Atatürk carried out a systemic intervention for survival: he turned the imperial remnant toward the West through secularization, Latinization, and the positioning of the army as a pillar of statehood.

Today, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, we are witnessing a return to the factory settings of imperial geography and the establishment of “real neo-Ottomanism”, a new kind of operating system for the state in which de-secularization and the rehabilitation of symbols, such as Hagia Sophia, constitute a deliberate integration of religious energy into national power. It is a constructivist superstructure built upon hard realist interest.

Ankara’s strategy of transforming itself from a regional “bridge” into an autonomous “centre” rests on several synchronized pillars of power.

First, on land and at sea, Türkiye is expanding its influence toward Central Asia through the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and the “Middle Corridor” trade artery, linking Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

Second, in the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, it acts assertively through the “Blue Homeland” maritime doctrine (Mavi Vatan) and control of the TANAP and TAP energy pipelines. To support this hard geoeconomics, Ankara also deploys a vast soft-power network through television series, the Diyanet religious administration, the Yunus Emre Institute, and the TİKA development agency. On the ground, these organizations function as peacetime “auxiliary logistical lines”, preparing public opinion and extending the political agenda.

The Incirlik paradox

PrestigeLeader of the Umma

  • Technological leader in the triangle with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
  • “Drone supremacy”, as with the Bayraktar TB2
  • Smart missiles, armoured vehicles and military shipbuilding
  • Supplier to the Muslim world, from Riyadh and Islamabad to Jakarta

FoundationThe Western security hemisphere

  • NATO member since 1952, guardian of the Alliance’s southern flank
  • Incirlik Air Base, a key node for US and NATO power projection
  • Decades of training in NATO’s network-centric warfare doctrine
  • Western core technology: chips, optics and sensors, propulsion engines, special alloys, machine software

“Türkiye is building its prestige as a leader of the Umma and a partner of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia precisely thanks to the technological and military accumulation it acquired as part of the Western security hemisphere.”

Figure 2. The Incirlik paradox. Ankara’s standing as a defence supplier to the Muslim world rests on capabilities accumulated inside the Western security hemisphere. Drawn from the author’s argument.

However, when Türkiye’s role as the technological leader in the triangle with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is analysed, every serious security assessment must underline two fundamental facts that are often left unspoken in public discourse:

First, the security link with NATO/the United States and Incirlik Air Base: Despite its balancing reflex and its purchase of the Russian S-400 system, for which Ankara consciously paid the price of exclusion from the F-35 programme, Türkiye has been a key NATO member since 1952 and the guardian of the Alliance’s southern flank. Incirlik Air Base on Turkish territory remains one of the most important geostrategic nodes for US and NATO power projection and strategic deterrence across the Middle East.

As the missile crises surrounding Iran demonstrated, when NATO air-defence systems intercept projectiles over Turkish territory, Ankara is directly integrated into the Euro-Atlantic defence mechanism, which carries with it the weight of Article 5 and the risk of “chain-ganging”: a condition of excessively tight alliance commitments in which a threat to a single link can automatically pull the entire Alliance into war.

Second, the Western “genetic code” of Türkiye’s military technology: There is no dispute that the Turkish defence industry, now symbolized by the doctrine of “drone supremacy”, as with the Bayraktar TB2, along with smart missiles, armoured vehicles, and military shipbuilding, has achieved an impressive breakthrough. This enables Ankara to act as a supplier to the Muslim world, from Riyadh and Islamabad to Jakarta.

But that technological boom did not emerge in a vacuum. The development of Turkish military technology is fundamentally rooted in deep Western operational concepts, especially NATO’s network-centric warfare doctrine in which Turkish officers and engineers have been trained for decades, and still structurally depends on core technology from the West, including highly sophisticated chips, optics and sensors, propulsion engines, special alloys, and machine software.

This gives rise to the central paradox: Türkiye is building its prestige as a leader of the Umma and a partner of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia precisely thanks to the technological and military accumulation it acquired as part of the Western security hemisphere.

Part IIAsia’s line of conflict

The Line of Pressure and Active Conflict: Russia, Iran, China, and the Indian Factor

The second major fracture shattering the image of a simple “Eastern bloc” lies along the line of pressure and active conflict encompassing Russia, Iran, China, and India. Each of these four actors proceeds according to its own civilizational and geopolitical calculation, often in direct conflict with the others. This is consistent with the author’s earlier treatment of Iran as a strategic connector between the Eurasian heartland, the Rimland and the warm-water corridors of trade and energy (Ivanov, 2026d).

The line of pressure and active conflict

Four actors, each proceeding by its own civilizational and geopolitical calculation

China

Calculation

Tianxia, “All Under Heaven”: a modern tributary system through the Belt and Road Initiative

Pressure

“Debt trap” fears and the “Malacca Dilemma”; needs Iran as a land bridge

Iran

Calculation

A mountain fortress on the northern shore of Hormuz, with an “immunity to isolation” after decades of sanctions

Pressure

Pressed from three sides: America’s alliances, its own societal security, the Sunni pact

Russia

Calculation

The International North-South Transport Corridor, Moscow to Mumbai through the Caspian and Iran

Pressure

Its only economic “lung” under Western sanctions, after losing much of the European market

India

Calculation

Energy ties with Russia and corridor interests through Iran, with strategic coordination with the US and Australia

Pressure

Pakistan’s irreconcilable adversary, facing the Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia alliance

ResultHostility between India and Pakistan prevents any unification of Eurasia against the West and gives Washington enormous room for offshore balancing.

Figure 3. The line of pressure and active conflict across Eurasia. Drawn from the author’s argument.

China does not base its rise on the Westphalian logic of equal sovereign states, but on the historical Sinocentric system of Tianxia, “All Under Heaven”.

As David C. Kang demonstrates, East Asia functioned for centuries through an accepted hierarchy in which peripheral states voluntarily sent “tribute” and paid ritual respect, kowtow, to the Chinese centre in exchange for trade access and stability (Kang, 2010).

Today, driven by systemic dissatisfaction that its enormous economic contribution after the financial crisis of 2008-2012 was not matched by a corresponding political and security share in governing the world, China is attempting to restore a modern version of that tributary system through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its patient “water strategy”. Yet Beijing faces serious resistance because developing countries fear “debt traps”, while its own maritime energy routes remain vulnerable in the “Malacca Dilemma”.

To bypass the oceans controlled by the US Navy, China needs Iran as a land bridge and a crucial Rimland connector within Sir Halford Mackinder’s theory of the “World Island” (Mackinder, 1919) (see: “Iran as the ‘Key Bastion’ of the Eurasian Security Architecture”).

Iran, which Tim Marshall describes in Prisoners of Geography as a natural mountain fortress protected by the Zagros and Alborz ranges and internal salt deserts, controls the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20–25 per cent (roughly a quarter) of the world’s seaborne oil passes. Although five decades of sanctions since 1979 have produced an “immunity to isolation” and an engineering paradox, with reverse engineering generating mass-produced drones such as the Shahed series and Fateh and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles, Iran is strategically pressed from three sides: externally by America’s “invisible wall” of alliances; internally by the volcano of its own “societal security”, in the Copenhagen School sense, namely the gap between a theocratic elite and a progressive young nation; and regionally by rivalry with the Sunni pact of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan.

Within this complex geometry, Russia, after losing access to the European market to a significant extent, depends on the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which links Moscow to Mumbai through the Caspian Sea and Iran, as its only economic “lung” under Western sanctions.

And it is in Mumbai and New Delhi that the circle of the great Asian contradiction closes. India, the next economic great power of the twenty-first century, is Pakistan’s irreconcilable historical, territorial, and strategic adversary.

That hostility draws the most dangerous line of active conflict in Asia. The rise of the military-technological alliance among Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia, underpinned by Chinese support for Islamabad, directly threatens India’s vital security interests.

That is why New Delhi, while maintaining energy ties with Russia and corridor interests through Iran, is simultaneously entering close strategic coordination with the United States and Australia in controlling the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, in order to balance China and Pakistan. In this way, hostility between India and Pakistan prevents any unification of Eurasia against the West and gives Washington enormous room for offshore balancing.

Part IIEurope’s awakening

Europe after the “Great Blindness” (1989-2014) and the Macedonian Compass in an Empty Space

The diagnosis also follows the author’s previous argument that Europe risks becoming an aesthetically impressive but strategically marginal “museum” if material power, demographic vitality and technological capacity remain detached from political ambition (Ivanov, 2025a).

Where is Europe while the economy and power regroup in the East? If we set aside bureaucratic embellishment, the root of the European Union’s present vulnerability is clear. It is the direct consequence of the period I previously described as the “great blindness” (1989-2014): a quarter-century of geopolitical coma in which the continent lived after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

During those twenty-five years, Europe’s political elites came to believe that history had ended, that economic interdependence had abolished geopolitics, and that Brussels’ normative regulation was an adequate substitute for hard military power, energy sovereignty, and demographic vitality.

In scholarship, this phenomenon is known as confirmation bias. It is a cognitive trap in which decision-makers consciously or unconsciously select and interpret only the information that confirms their preferred belief, while ignoring every signal that contradicts it.

After eight decades under the American security umbrella, Washington’s expectation that Europe must shoulder a greater share of the burden for its own defence and for stabilizing its own neighbourhood is entirely natural and rational. Europe’s greatest risk today does not come from outside, but from the inertia of years of self-deception and the belief that its attractiveness is eternal. In this sense, it was a mistake to treat enlargement toward the Western Balkans indefinitely as a slow technical procedure rather than as a primary geopolitical necessity.

For geopolitics observes one harsh rule: there is no empty space. Every space Europe leaves as an “eternal waiting room” is immediately filled by other actors who understand that geopolitics is the will to be present: The same proposition underpins the author’s analysis of the Balkans as a zone in which external narratives and institutional capture flourish whenever European strategy is absent or indecisive (Ivanov, 2026e).

  • Within that vacuum in the Balkans and Macedonia, the Turkish model of emotional connection and neo-Ottoman pragmatism has already penetrated deeply, through TİKA restoration projects, the Maarif and Yunus Emre educational foundations, scholarships, and the media dominance of television series that build political capital;
  • At the same time, the Chinese model is adapting. It has learned from the problems associated with purely infrastructure-based loans from the Exim Bank and motorway projects involving Sinohydro, and is now investing in long-term soft power through the Confucius Institute, academic exchanges, and media study visits.

Europe’s way out lies neither in isolation nor in rhetorical sparring with Washington, but in an urgent awakening from its geopolitical coma. Europe must unambiguously choose the path of real power and demonstrate a firm, cohesive alliance with the United States, because every transatlantic fissure at this moment represents a direct geoeconomic victory for its Asian competitors.

Part IIThe lesson for North Macedonia

The Long-Term Point: The Lesson for North Macedonia

What does this tectonic redistribution of power mean for small states such as North Macedonia, situated precisely at the crossroads of Euro-Atlantic, Middle Eastern, and Asian corridors?

Whenever politicians and day-to-day commentators authoritatively declare, “History teaches us...”, our first duty as researchers and citizens must be scientific scepticism grounded in three essential questions:

  1. Whose history? Are we reading only the comforts of Eurocentrism, or do we understand the deep systems of the Sinocentric East, Tianxia, and the transnational energy of the Umma?
  2. With what data? Are state policies designed around deceptive statistical averages, or are we prepared for the “fat-tail” extremes in which the real risk of systemic security and energy shocks is concealed?
  3. To what end? Is history used instrumentally, merely as an excuse for day-to-day politics, or genuinely to understand future transformations in a world where Power follows the economy?

In such a world of harsh realism, North Macedonia’s state strategy must not allow the instinct for survival to turn into strategic disorientation. As I have already formulated in my analyses, North Macedonia needs the “power of intelligent silence” and five clear lines of resistance: The five lines below should therefore be read not as isolated policy recommendations, but as the Macedonian application of the wider framework developed across the author’s published sequence on strategic anarchy, Eurasian corridors, alliance structures and the return of spheres of influence (Ivanov, 2026a, 2026b, 2026c, 2026d).

  • Intelligent balancing without unnecessary overexposure: As a small state within the Western alliance, we must use the arguments of international law for our own protection, but without falling into the trap of “loud cheerleading” in other actors’ geopolitical contests, which only increases our risk in the next major bargains.
  • Energy and corridor capitalization: Accelerated energy diversification through the southern route and Greece, including LNG terminals and interconnectors, and the full materialization of Corridor VIII’s transit role.
  • Digital sovereignty and cyber resilience: Uncompromising protection of state registers and critical information infrastructure as the new frontier of sovereignty.
  • An institutional filter for soft power: Full transparency and legal oversight of the financing of cultural, educational, and religious infrastructures through which external actors build parallel influence.
  • Technological modernization within NATO: Learning from contemporary doctrines of unmanned aerial vehicles, air defence, and electronic warfare, including from the Turkish model, but exclusively through NATO standards and without creating unilateral technological or financial dependence.

From a balance-of-power perspective, this conclusion is compatible with classical realism, but it should not be reduced to a simple celebration of force. Morgenthau’s insistence on interest defined in terms of power was also an argument for prudence, proportion and the disciplined adjustment of ends to means (Morgenthau, 1948). Walt’s balance-of-threat approach adds a further correction: states do not react mechanically to material capability, but to the combination of power, proximity, offensive potential and interpreted intentions (Walt, 1987). The “invisible wall” of alliances is therefore strongest when it converts local threat perceptions into durable institutional alignment, not when it relies on coercion alone.

The constructivist dimension is equally important. The Umma, Tianxia, neo-Ottoman symbolism and Europe’s self-image operate as political forces because they shape the categories through which interests are understood. Mandaville’s account of transnational Muslim politics and Hurd’s critique of the secular assumptions embedded in international-relations theory help explain why religious and civilizational solidarities cannot be treated as decorative rhetoric outside the “real” domain of security (Mandaville, 2001; Hurd, 2008). Identity does not replace material power, but it can organize, legitimate and direct it.

This is also why the argument developed across my published columns should be read cumulatively rather than as a series of disconnected reactions to current events. “Why Europe May End Up as the World’s Most Beautiful Museum” introduced the language of chromatic geopolitics and Europe’s strategic exhaustion (Ivanov, 2025a). “The Geopolitical Reflex of the Bosporus Throne” examined Türkiye’s movement from bridge to centre (Ivanov, 2025b). “Venezuela: Morgenthau and Monroe in the New Multipolar Design” placed geography, economy and threat within a renewed logic of hemispheric discipline (Ivanov, 2026b). “20 Days to the New Geopolitical Anarchy? From Eros to Thanatos” identified the erosion of regulated deterrence (Ivanov, 2026c), while “Iran as the Key Bastion of the Eurasian Security Architecture” traced the corridor logic binding Russia, China, Iran and India (Ivanov, 2026d). The later synthesis, “Anatomy of the New Global Order: From Donbas to the Taiwan Strait,” brought these theatres together as expressions of a single redistribution of power (Ivanov, 2026a).

Seen through that cumulative framework, North Macedonia’s problem is not that it lacks access to global narratives. It is that imported narratives can easily substitute for domestic strategic thought. The remedy is neither isolation nor reflexive alignment with every signal from a larger ally. It is the construction of institutional memory, analytical capacity and a hierarchy of national interests. This point connects geopolitical orientation with an internal security prerequisite developed in “Anatomy of Forgetting”: a state that repeatedly erases its own institutional memory cannot sustain intelligent balancing, because it cannot distinguish continuity from improvisation or strategy from daily political theatre (Ivanov, 2026f).

The illusions of the post-historical world are dead, and geopolitical coma is a luxury no one can afford any longer. In the decades ahead, as American power projection, the transnational gravity of the Umma, and the Asian giants draw new boundaries of influence, survival and prosperity will belong only to those states that understand that narrative can never replace structure, and that the national interest is defended through institutional discipline, knowledge, and cold strategic calculation. Everything else is a footnote.

References

  1. Buzan, B., & Little, R. (2000). International systems in world history: Remaking the study of international relations. Oxford University Press.
  2. Hurd, E. S. (2008). The politics of secularism in international relations. Princeton University Press.
  3. Ivanov, A. (2025a, December 15). Why Europe may end up as the world’s most beautiful museum [Column]. MKD.mk. https://mkd.mk/kolumni/zoshto-evropa-mozhe-da-zavrshi-kako-najubaviot-muzej-na-svetot/
  4. Ivanov, A. (2025b, December 30). The geopolitical reflex of the Bosporus throne [Column]. MKD.mk. https://mkd.mk/kolumni/geopolitichkiot-refleks-na-bosforskiot-prestol/
  5. Ivanov, A. (2025c, December 14). The tragedy of narcissistic nations: How Europe lost the future in Ukraine [Column]. MKD.mk. https://mkd.mk/kolumni/tragedijata-na-narcisoidnite-narodi-kako-evropa-ja-izgubi-idninata-vo-ukraina/
  6. Ivanov, A. (2026a, March 21). Anatomy of the new global order: From Donbas to the Taiwan Strait [Column]. MKD.mk. https://mkd.mk/kolumni/anatomija-na-noviot-globalen-poredok-od-donbas-do-tajvanskiot-tesnec/
  7. Ivanov, A. (2026b, January 4). Venezuela: Morgenthau and Monroe in the new multipolar design [Column]. MKD.mk. https://mkd.mk/kolumni/venecuela-morgentau-i-monro-vo-noviot-multipolaren-dizajn-33-dena-do-krajot-na-new-start/
  8. Ivanov, A. (2026c, January 15). 20 days to the new geopolitical anarchy? From Eros to Thanatos [Column]. MKD.mk. https://mkd.mk/kolumni/20-dena-do-novata-geopolitichka-anarhija-od-eros-do-tanatos/
  9. Ivanov, A. (2026d, January 30). Iran as the “key bastion” of the Eurasian security architecture [Column]. MKD.mk. https://mkd.mk/kolumni/iran-kako-kluchniot-bedem-na-evroaziskata-bezbednosna-arhitektura/
  10. Ivanov, A. (2026e, May 19). Architecture of the Balkan tragedy: Foreign narratives, captured institutions and the only way out [Column]. MKD.mk. https://mkd.mk/kolumni/arhitektura-na-balkanskata-tragedija-tugji-narativi-kidnapirani-institucii-i-edinstveniot-izlez/
  11. Ivanov, A. (2026f, February 5). Anatomy of forgetting: How did we erase institutional memory? [Column]. MKD.mk. https://mkd.mk/kolumni/anatomija-na-zaboravot-kako-ja-izbrishavme-institucionalnata-memorija-i-dali-imame-sila-da-ja-vratime/
  12. Ivanov, A. (2026, March 18). The geopolitics of empty space: The lesson Europe refuses to learn (Original Macedonian title: “Геополитика на празниот простор: Лекцијата што Европа одбива да ја научи”) [Column]. CivilMedia. https://civilmedia.mk/geopolitika-na-prazniot-prostor-lektsijata-shto-evropa-odbiva-da-ja-nauchi/
  13. Ivanov, A. (2026, March 10). The invisible wall: How decades-old alliances encircled Iran and redefined the balance of threat (Original Macedonian title: “Невидливиот ѕид: како децениските сојузи го опколија Иран и го редефинираа балансот на заканата”) [Column]. CivilMedia. https://civilmedia.mk/nevidliviot-zid-kako-detseniskite-sojuzi-go-opkolija-iran-i-go-redefiniraa-balansot-na-zakanata/
  14. Kang, D. C. (2010). East Asia before the West: Five centuries of trade and tribute. Columbia University Press.
  15. Mackinder, H. J. (1919). Democratic ideals and reality: A study in the politics of reconstruction. Constable and Company.
  16. Mandaville, P. (2001). Transnational Muslim politics: Reimagining the Umma. Routledge.
  17. Marshall, T. (2015). Prisoners of geography: Ten maps that tell you everything you need to know about global politics. Elliott & Thompson.
  18. Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. Alfred A. Knopf.
  19. Nye, J. S., Jr. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs.
  20. Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliances. Cornell University Press.

About the author

Portrait of Aleksandar Ivanov

Aleksandar Ivanov

Full Professor and Head of the Research Center, Faculty of Security – Skopje, University ‘St. Kliment Ohridski’ – Bitola; Member of the Institute for National and International Security (INIS)

Prof. Dr. Aleksandar Ivanov (Dr.sc.) is a Full Professor and Head of the Research Center at the Faculty of Security – Skopje, University ‘St. Kliment Ohridski’ – Bitola, and a member of the Institute for National and International Security (INIS). His research and publications focus on international relations, geopolitics, security studies, and disaster management. He writes a regular column on geopolitics, where parts of this analysis were first published in Macedonian.

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Cite this article

Ivanov, A. (2026, November). Shifting gravity eastward: Between American power projection and the geopolitical awakening of the Umma. GCRD Insights. Global Centre for Rehumanising Democracy.

Published by the Global Centre for Rehumanising Democracy (GCRD) in the GCRD Insights series.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Global Centre for Rehumanising Democracy.

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